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Abstract
Deficiencies in Kauffman’s proposal regarding a new way for building
scientific theories are pointed out. A suggestion to overcome them,
and in fact, independently construct mathematical theories which are
beyond the reach of Goedel’s incompleteness theorem is presented.
This suggestion is based on bringing together recent developments
in literature regarding inconsistent mathematics and self-referential
mathematics.
1. Overshooting the Target
Reductionist science is meant by Kauffman, [1], to be any theory which
is built exclusively upon entailments involving efficient causes in the
traditional sense of Aristotle. And in view of Goedel’s incompleteness
theorem, as well as Hawking’s recent paper [2], Kauffman sees the ne-
cessity to propose a way aimed at going beyond reductionist science.
Such a proposal, needless to say, is welcome. And it would be so in-
dependently of Goedel’s result. After all, as long as one is pursuing
science in proper ways there should not be a priori limitations on it,
even if they may happen to come for strongly entrenched historical
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traditions.
The issue, therefore, is which may indeed be certain proper ways for
science beyond the one called reductionist in [1].
In this regard, one can note that the analysis in [2] is rather naive,
since it interprets Goedel’s incompleteness as a consequence of the
self-referential situation in which physicists are inevitably part of the
physical realms. As for going beyond what in [1] is called reductionist
science, the suggestion in [2] simply consists in a succession of reduc-
tionist theories of physics, succession in which larger and larger sets
of axioms are assumed, thus managing to some rather limited extent
to overcome Goedel’s incompleteness.
From the point of view of such a rather trivial suggestion, the proposal
in [1] is considerably more sophisticated and deep. Yet, as argued in
the sequel, it is highly questionable on several grounds, and above all,
in view of the fact that it cannot secure ways which could be seen as
representing in any more proper manner a rigorously enough scientific
approach.
The basic model in [1] which inspires the specific proposal aimed at go-
ing beyond reductionist science is taken from biology, and specifically,
from Darwin’s view of the evolution of species. The way Darwin’s view
is understood in [1] is that evolution in biology is not - and simply,
cannot be - merely a process based on the action of efficient causes
alone. Instead, it is the effect of an interplay between laws which act
as enabling constraints, and on the other hand, efficient causes which
become operational within the respective constraints, with both con-
straints and causes partly interacting and evolving, as if according to,
what is called, some ”blind final cause”.
Let us now consider to what extent such an understanding of Dar-
winian evolution in biology may indeed be an appropriate method for
building future scientific theories, instead of the present method in
which mathematical theories are axiomatically founded and then de-
veloped according to rules of logic, while theories of physics tend to
be based on such mathematical theories.
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An obvious feature of the proposal in [1] is that it can be significantly
loose in the way efficient causes may come into play within the enabling
constraints of laws. Furthermore, this looseness may considerably in-
crease during the assumed interplay between the enabling laws and
the efficient causes acting within their constraints.
Therefore, one can only wonder to what extent such a considerably
loose process run by some assumed ”blind final cause” can possibly
lead to scientific theories which perform, when applied in technologies,
with any kind of more appropriate precision, a precision for instance
which Kauffman himself may, no doubt, require in the construction of
any airplane he may ever wish to consider flying with ...
In biology, the results of such loose processes are not supposed to - and
certainly, do not - lead to any scientific theory, but to individual living
creatures. And an essential difference between a scientific theory and
an individual living creature is, among others, the following. Such a
living creature is biologically easily disposable. That is, the species to
which it belongs need not necessarily vanish with the demise of that
individual. And even if in some highly unusual situation the existence
of a whole species may depend on the survival of that individual, the
death of that individual is not likely to lead to the end of biosphere
as a whole ...
Thus the biological viability, that is, the validity of such an individ-
ual as a biological entity, has hardly any risk attached to it outside
of the respective individual. This is precisely why Darwinian evolu-
tion, to the extent that it operates as assumed in [1], has so far not
come anywhere near to put an end to the whole of biosphere as such ...
In total contradistinction with such a practically no risk biological sit-
uation, a scientific theory, when accepted, introduces a considerable
risk, and it does so from theoretical point of view, since it may become
a component of further scientific theories. And it does even more so,
as soon as certain technologies are developed involving it.
A living creature which turns out to be biologically invalidated, that
is, it ends up by being selected off the biosphere does nowhere the
same kind of massive harm an unvalidated scientific theory can cause,
be it in the theoretical or practical realms.
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Therefore, the validity of a scientific theory in mathematics or physics,
among others, is of uppermost immediate concern, a concern of both
theoretic and practical nature. Consequently, the issue of that validity
simply cannot be left to the mercy of some ”blind final cause” ...
It follows that the proposal in [1] is clearly overshooting the target by
allowing far too many allegedly scientific theories to be built, without
any systematic manner of validation, except for some future action of
a ”blind final cause” ...
In case theories generated as proposed in [1] were not aimed for mathe-
matics or physics, but rather for, say, psychology, sociology, economics,
or the like, then, as a rather unfortunate human tradition may illus-
trate it, they may not seldom turn out to be acceptable for quite a
while, that is, until such time when their nefarious consequences would
become far too obvious for far too many ...
However, as far as mathematics, physics, chemistry, or for that mat-
ter, molecular biology are concerned, the validity of scientific theories
should rather be built upon the well known criteria of rigor and pre-
cision in their construction, as well as present testing, instead of that
left to some assumed ”blind final cause” ...
A further major deficiency of the proposal in [1] is in its total lack of
any kind of specific insight into the micro or inner aspects of the ways
scientific theories end up being effectively constructed. Indeed, the
proposal in [1] only sets up a macro type framework for the produc-
tion of scientific theories, namely, through the mentioned interplay
between laws which act as enabling constraints for certain efficient
causes. And clearly, such a setup cannot give more insight into the
specifics of the effective construction of scientific theories than an outer
observer of the respective process could obtain.
Indeed, we are required by the proposal in [1] simply to abandon com-
pletely the present way scientific axiomatic theories are constructed
step by step, that is, through a process which in its rigorous formal
aspect offers a considerable transparency.
In conclusion, the proposal in [1] as it stands is considerably unrealis-
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tic when it aims to deliver scientific theories.
However, it is at the same time important to realize that a suitable
completion of the proposal in [1] can possibly have significant merit.
And such a completion may involve the following two additions :
1) The extreme abundance - referred to above as overshooting - in the
production of alleged scientific theories, as inevitably follows from the
present form of the proposal in [1], should be suitably curtailed.
2) The micro, or inner specific aspects in the construction of scientific
theories should be specified in a clear, rigorous and transparent way.
Related to the above second point, we make now certain suggestions.
2. Nearer to the Target
As mentioned, the concern with going beyond the present day ax-
iomatic theories in mathematics or physics has lately gained some
attention.
The suggestion in [2] seems to be too simple, and certainly, it does not
address in any way the deeper reasons why usual axiomatic theories in
mathematics or physics fall prey to Goedel’s incompleteness theorem.
On the other hand, the proposal in [1] does open up a far larger pos-
sible pool for scientific theories, and in fact, as argued above, does so
excessively. Furthermore, that proposal, similar to [1], fails to con-
sider and identify those essential features of usual axiomatic theories
in mathematics or physics which make Goedel’s incompleteness theo-
rem apply to them.
Here, following [3-6], we suggest a way to implement the requirement
2) at the end of the previous section. It should be noted that, as
seen next, the implementation suggested here offers the construction
of axiomatic mathematical theories which go far beyond the usual,
presently used ones. Consequently, it can all alone, and by itself give
a significant departure beyond the mathematical theories which hap-
pen to be subjected to Goedel’s incompleteness theorem.
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Also, this suggestion can be used in conjunction with the proposal in
[1], as soon as that proposal is amended according to the requirement
in 1) at the end of the previous section.
And now, to our suggestion based on [3-6], which is further based on
[7-9].
Historically, there has since times immemorial been an absolute rejec-
tion of systems of thought which lead to logical contradiction.
One of the effects of that total rejection has been the rejection of self-
referential logical constructs, since as know from ancient times, they
often led to contradictions, as illustrated in the famous ancient Greek
paradox of the liar.
Recently however, [7,4], there has been an interest in inconsistent
mathematics, that is, mathematics built upon a contradictory set of
axioms.
Amusingly in this regard, in spite of the mentioned absolute rejec-
tion of logical contradictions, and especially in mathematics, we have
nevertheless kept more and more indulging ourselves precisely in such
mathematics ever since the use of digital electronic computers.
Indeed, albeit missed by nearly everyone, such computers are in-
evitably functioning based on the following system of axioms, when
considered operating upon integers :
1) The Peano Axioms
plus
2) The Machine Infinity Axiom
which is usually formulated as follows :
(MIA) ∃ M >> 1 : M + 1 = M
where typically, one may have M = 10100.
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And clearly, the system of axioms 1) plus 2) is contradictory.
Yet we do not hesitate to use our digital electronic computers more
and more massively, and even fly in airplanes designed and constructed
with their essential help.
Details, albeit rather elementary, regarding the safe use of such con-
tradictory axiomatic systems can be found in [7,4].
So much for the traditional ”no-go” regarding logical contradictions.
As for the other traditional ”no-go”, namely, of self-referential logical
constructs, it happened in the early 1980s that the use of digital elec-
tronic computers led to yet another fundamental reconsideration, [8,9].
Namely, far reaching research was undertaken in foundations of a set
theory along lines which contain a significant amount of self-referential
definitions, yet, unlike the usual set theory with the Russell paradox,
do not lead to any contradictions, provided that usual set theory does
not do so either.
As it happens so far, this self-referential mathematics has on purpose
been developed only with the aim to be consistent, provided that the
usual set theory is so, [8,9,6]. And as can be seen, even within the
confines of that restriction, it leads to a most remarkable extension of
usual set theory, and thus of mathematics as such.
As a further step, therefore, one may consider the joining of incon-
sistent mathematics with self-referential mathematics. And in doing
so, it may well happen that the resulting theories would no longer be
within the realms of Goedel’s incompleteness theorem.
As for the possibility of that happening, we can recall that the proof
of Goedel’s incompleteness theorem does essentially involve a self-
referential argument, brought about by the arithmetisation through
the celebrated Goedel numbering of the propositions of Peano arith-
metics. Thus to the extent that one goes over to mathematical the-
ories which from the start are self-referential, the situation with the
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Goedel argument may change. Furthermore, the operative effect of the
Goedel argument is that it leads to the dichotomy that either Peano
arithmetics is inconsistent, or it is incomplete. Hence, once one is
no longer rejecting inconsistent mathematical theories, the mentioned
conclusion of incompleteness of Goedel’s respective argument may fall
away.
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